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EVALUATION OF FUZZY RULEMAKING FOR EXPERT SYSTEMS FOR FAILURE DETECTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Frank Laritz and Thomas B. Sheridan 
Man-Machine Systems Laboratory 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Computer aids in the form of so called "expert systems" have been proposed 
repeatedly for making diagnoses of failures in complex systems. 
1 The fuzzy set theory of Zadeh has been shown to offer an interesting new 
perspective for modeling the way humans think and use language. In 
particular, we assume that real expert human operators of aircraft, power 
plants and other systems do not think of their control tasks or failure 
diagnosis tasks in terms of control laws in differential equation form, but 
rather keep in mind a set of rules of thumb in fuzzy form. For the reader 
ignorant of fuzzy sets the experiment described below communicates by 
example the gist of the idea. 
FIRST EXPERIMENT 
Five subjects repeatedly adjusted two "inputs" A and B to a "black box" to 
any value between 10 and 100, set a "failure mode" to anyone of four 
available settings including "no failure", and observe two "outputs" C and 
D. The contents of the black box were not revealed. The subjects' task was 
to correlate inputs and outputs with failure modes and from this infer 
rules by which 'to assert whether and in what mode the black box had 
"failed" as a function of the two inputs and ,two outputs. 
Actually the black box was a simple resistor network as shown in Figure 1 
in which one of the resistors 1,2,3,4 was selectively opened (or none was). 
After each subject had completed a number of trials (they were all really 
learning trials) he was asked to formulate rules in terms of 
easy-to-remember descriptors for the four variables like "low", "medium" 
and "high" using these descriptors he was to generate rules such as: 
"when A is low and B is medium or high and C is high and D is medium or 
high, the failure is mode 2". 
There could be any number of such (fuzzy) descriptors and any number of 
such rules, and the subjects were free to format them in tables or however 
they wished. They could also combine variables in forms such as C/D and 
C-D. 
The subjects were also asked to produce functions of each descriptor (fuzzy 
set) defining what they "meant". Each function specified "membership" or 
"truth" as a function of the values of the corresponding variable (in the 
range 10-100). Two of the five subjects observed the black box behavior 
first, then devised the rules, and lastly devised membership functions. 
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Figure 1. Simple resistor network comprising the "black box" 
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The others chose to invent terms and define the membership functions first. 
As an example Figure 2 lists the rules given by one subject (JR) and Figure 
3 presents his membership functions. Note that certain regions of A,B and 
O-C were (apparantly intentionally) not covered by his membership functions 
(and rules). For contrast the membership functions of a second subject are 
also shown (Figure 4). 
For each' subject independently the experimenter derived the state-action 
matrix (failure mode as a function of input and output numerical values) 
using the conventioanl "max moo for "or" and min moo for "ANO". He then 
proceeded to eva:luate each resulting expert system not only against single· 
complete failures (the basis in which the subjects made up their rules) but 
also on multiple complete failures and single partial failures (5% changes 
rather than 100% changes in resistance). For a given set of inputs and 
outputs each subject's expert system yielded a "truth value" for each 
failure mode for each combination of A,B,C,O. A simple procedure is to 
assert failure for that mode having the greatest truth value greater than 
some threshold and no failure for t,ruth less than that, threshold. Laritz 
used this as one decision criterion" (which he called the "most true" 
criterion) but also counted the number of times u for each mode exceeded 
0.5 (the "times true" criterion), and the sum of truth values for each mode 
("truth summation" criterion). Figure 5 summarizes the rather impressive 
success of subject JR's expert system, and for comparison Figure 6 
summarizes 'that of .. subject OM. The performances of the other fuzzy ~xpert 
systems lay s?mewhere in between. 
CONCLUSIONS FROM FIRST EXPERIMENT 
From this first experiment we concluded: 
1. The method of observing trends,then formulating rules, and then 
defining fuzzy values captures more of the human's ingenuity and 
pattern recognition ability and provides a better expert failue 
detection system than the method or creating fuzzy values"then 
gathering data, and then deducing rules. 
2. If the second method is used, it is best to put the membeship functions 
for the fuzzy values on paper at the outset so that there will be. no 
loss of information later. 
3. Expert systems using non-fuzzy values require perfect failure rules. 
When the rules are not perfect, the expert system does not perform 
well. 
4. Although not explicitly defined for this purpose in the investigation, 
the fuzzy expert systems did remarkably well in detecting and locating 
multiple and partial failures. This means that fuzzy methods have some 
robustness. 
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( 1 , 1 ) If A is high and B is low and D is significantly 
greater than C, then the system is in failure mode 1 • 
( 2 , 1 ) If A is high and H is low and " is significantly v 
greater than D, then the system is in failure mode 2. 
( 3 , 1 ) If A is lmf and. B i,a high and D is Significantly 
greater than ,.., then the system is in failure ;:node 3. '" , 
( 4 , 1 ) If A is low and B is high and I' is significantly v 
greatar than D, then the system is in failure Inoje 4. 
(5 , 1 ) If A is high and B is high and D is slightly 
greater than C, then the system. is in failure mode O. 
Figure 2. Fuzzy decision rules inferred by subject JR 
" 
A,B ~--~------~----~------~------------~----~--J 
10 
I C> ;) I 
I 
~ , 
o 
-12. 
41 34- 85 
-Li -.5 ., 7 
Figure 3. Membership functions devised by subject JR 
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Figure 4. Membership functions devised by subject DM 
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TEST 1: SINGLE COMPLETE FAILURE 
ACTUAL FAILURE IDENTIFIED FAILURE 
MOST-TRUE THiES-TRUE TRUTH-SUM..'fATION 
1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 
3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 4 
0 0 0 0 
SCORE: 5/5 5/5 5/5 
TEST 2: MULTIPLE COMPLETE FAILURES 
ACTUAL FAILURES 
1,3 
1,4 
2,3 
2,4 
SCORE : 
MOST-TRUE 
3 
1,4 
2,3 
2,4 
4/4 
TEST 3: SINGLE PARTIAL FAILURE 
ACTUAL FAILURE 
1 
2 
3 
4 
SCORE: 
TOTAL SCORE: 
MOST-TRUE 
1 (55%) 
2 (75%) 
3 (70%) 
4 (80%) 
4/4 
13/13 
* = INCORRECT DECISION 
IDENTIFIED FAILURE 
TL'1ES-TRUE 
3 
1 
3 
2 
4/4 
TRUTH-SUMMATION 
1 
1 
3 
2 
4/4 
IDENTIFIED FAILURE 
TL\fES-TRUE TRUTH-SUMMATIO~ 
1 (50%) 1 (55%) 
2 (70%) 2 (55%) 
3 (70%) 3 (65~n 
4 (75%) 4 (65%) 
4/4 4/4 
13/13 13/13 
FigureS. Results of applying JR's expert system 
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TEST 1: SINGLE COMPLETE FAILURE 
ACTUAL FAILURE IDENTIFIED FAILURE 
MOST-TRUE TL'1ES-TRUE TRUTH-SUMMATION 
1 1 1 1 
2 * 1,2 2 2 3 Ie 1,3 Ie 1 Ie 1 
4 Ie 1,4 4 4 
0 0 0 0 
.... _-
SCORE: 2/5 4/5 4/5 
TEST 2; :1ULTIPLE CO~PLETE FAILURES 
ACTUAL FAILURES IDENTIFIED FAILURE 
. MOST-TRUE TL'1ES-TRUE TRUTH-SUMMATION 
1,3 1,3 1 1 
1,4 Ie 1,4,0 1 1 
2.3 Ie 2,3,4,0 2 2 
2,4 2 2 2 
SCORE: 2/4 4/4 4/4 
TEST J: SINGLE PARTIAL FAILURE 
ACTUAL. FAILURE IDENTIFIED FAILURE 
MOST-TRUE TL'1ES-TRUE TRUTH-Sm1M.ATIO~ 
1 1 (80%) 1 (55%) 1 (50%) 
2 Ie 4 Ie 4 * 4 
3 3 (70%) 3 (65%) 3 (60%) 
4 * 1,4 4 (30%) Ie 1 
SCORE: 2/4 3/4 2/4 
TOTAL SCORE: 6/13 11/13 10/13 
* ~ INCORRECT DECISION 
Figure 6. Results of applying DM's expert system 
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5. The decision method can be chosen to suit the strength and tightness of 
the rules. Stronger rules require less margin for error. 
6. Expert systems which have approximately the same number of rules for 
each failure mode perform better than those with an uneven distribution 
SECOND EXPERIMENT 
As a second experiment the first author used himself as a subject on a 
black box resistor network that was much more complex (sufficiently so that 
he had no advantage over a subject who did not know what was inside). 
Again there were two adjustable inputs and two resulting outputs but this 
time eight failure modes. The first author experimented and observed, then 
derived his rules, (Figure 7) then defined his membership functions, and 
finally derived an expert system on the same basis as before. Results 
showed that the expert system worked perfectly on complete failures but 
faltered on mUltiple complete failures and partial failures (Figure 8). 
Further attempts to refine his decision rules showed little gain in 
discriminabililty. 
CONCLUSIONS FROM SECOND EXPERIMENT 
One can conclude from these results that acompute~given relatively little 
knowledge in fuzzy form from persons who are "expert" in the behavior of a 
sufficiently simple system under complete failures, can perform very well 
in identification of such failures. But when the system is complex and 
failures are multiple or partial and the expert's knowledge is not derived 
on the basis of experiencing such failures, an expert system cannot be 
expected to perform very well. 
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TEST 1: SINGLE COMPLETE FAILURE 
ACTUAL FAILUU IDENTIFIED FAILURE 
MOST-TaUE Tl.'tES-TRUE TR.UTH-SUMMATION 
1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 
3 3 3 3 
4 4 4 4 
~ 5 5 5 
6 6 6 6 
7 7 7 7 
8 8 8 8 
0 0 0 0 
SCORE: 9/9. 9/9 9/9 
rEST 2: MULTIPLE COMPLETE FAILURES 
ACTUAL FAILURES IDE~TIFIED FAILlIR.E 
MOST-TaUE TI.'lES-TRUE nUTH-SUMMATION 
1,2 2 2 2 
L ,3 1 L L 
1,4 1 1 1 
1 ,5 1 * L, 7 t 
1,6 1 1 1 
1,7 * 5 * 5 * 5 
L ,8 8 8 8 
2,3 2 2 2 
2,-+ 4 4 4 
2,5 * 4 * .:. 5 
2,& 6 6 & 
2,7 7 7 2 
2,8 2 * L ,2 * 1 
3,4 4 4 4 
3,3 5 5 5 
3,6 6 6 3 
3,7 7 7 7 
3,8 8 8 8 
4,5 * 7 * 7 * 7 
4,6 6 6 6 
4.7 * 5 * 5 * :5 
4,8 * 6 * 6 * 6 5 6 * 1 * 1 * 1 
5,7 * 0 * 0 * f) 
5,$ * 2 * 0 * 2 
6,7 * 4 * 8 * ~ 
6,8 6 6' 6 
7,8 * 4 * 4 * 1 
SCORE: 18/28 16/28 18/28 
TEST 3: SINGLE PARTIAL FAILUU 
ACTUAL FA~LURE IDENTIFIED FAILURE 
:-IOST-rRllE TI!1ES-TRUE raUT:I-S\OO1ATION 
1 1 (55%) 1 (55%) * 2 • 
2 2 (65%) 2 (65%) 2 (25%) 
3 3 (60%) 3 (60%) * 2 4 * 3 * 3 * 2 
5 * 2 * 2 * . .. 
6 
• 8 * 8 * d 7 * 4 * 4 * :: 
8 8 (55%) B (55%) * 2 
...--
SCORE: 4/8 4/8 1/8 
'faTAL SCORE: 31/45 29/45 28/45 
* • INCORRECT DECISION 
Figure 8. Results of applying Laritz' expert system to 
failures of complex resistor network 
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